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RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4503 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-4191 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC. ] 
a Utah corporation and BRYAN 
CHRISTENSEN, ] 
Plaintiffs/appellant, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendant/respondent. 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Civil No. 890540-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is granted in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) Section 78-2a-2j and Rule 4A of Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. This case was originally filed in 
the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred, at the discretion of 
the Supreme Court, to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered against 
plaintiff/appellant Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
and Bryan Christensen in favor of defendant/respondent State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Co. and Leon Maxwell. This Judgment was 
entered, pursuant to a defendant/respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, by the Honorable James S. Sawaya in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for the county of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment with 
regards to the claim of defamation. 
2. The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment with 
regards to the Claim of tortious interference with prospective 
business relations. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
UCA Section 45-2-3(3) 
"In a communication, without malice to a person 
interested therein by one who is also interested or by 
one who stands in relation to the person interested as 
to afford a reasonable ground for supposing mode for 
communication innocent or who is requested by the 
person interested to give the information shall fall 
within the privilege designated by statute and 
therefore not be libelous or slanderous per se". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 19th day of November, 1987 plaintiffs by 
and through their attorney Randall W. Richards filed a Complaint 
in the above entitled action. This Complaint among other things 
alleged: 
a. That the defendants had established and carried out a 
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continuous and willful plan of defamation of plaintiff. 
(Complaint paragraph 15) 
b. That defendants had told customers and potential 
customers of plaintiff, that plaintiff did inferior work, charges 
excess for the work, were dishonest in their business dealings, 
and that plaintiff!s shop should be avoided. (Complaint paragraph 
16) 
c. That defendants consistently and maliciously told 
customers or prospective customers of plaintiff that plaintiff 
did inferior work and engaged in dishonest and deceptive business 
practices and charged more than they should for body work. (See 
paragraph 25 of Complaint) 
d. Plaintifffs further allege that the actions of the 
defendants constituted tortious interference with prospective 
business relations. (Complaint paragraph 2 6) 
e. Plaintiff!s allege that the defamatory statements as 
well as the tortious interference have resulted in special and 
general damages in varying amounts. (Paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 27, 
28 and 29 of plaintifffs Complaint) 
2. Bryan Christensen and Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. have, 
since its opening in 1976, conducted business with State Farm. 
(Bryan Christensen Deposition, Vol. 1 pg. 12) 
3. In charging State Farm, as well as other customers, 
Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. utilizes Mitchell Manual and other 
estimating guide line books for pricing the repairs. (Bryan 
Christensen Deposition, Vol. 1 Pg.21) 
3 
4. Chris1 Body & Paint ordinarily accepts estimates or 
appraisals done by State Farm. (Bryan Christensen Deposition, 
Vo. 1 Pg. 23-24) 
5. Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. on occasion does not accept 
State Farm estimates. They are not accepted in the instances 
where there have been one or more items missed and in those 
instances, they call for reinspection from the State Farm 
appraiser. (Bryan Christensen Deposition, Vol. 1 Pg. 24, 27-28) 
6. Since Chris1 Body Shop has been in business, they have 
never refused to work off one of State Farm!s estimates. (Bryan 
Christensen Deposition, Vol. 2 Pg. 75-76) 
7. In regards to mechanical work, Chris' Body Shop performs 
and has agreed to perform mechanical work at below the prevailing 
rate for mechanic shops. (Bryan Christensen Deposition, Vol. 2 
Pg. 76-78) 
8. With regards to frame work, Bryan Christensen accepts 
State Farm's estimates on the frame work regardless of what State 
Farm decides to pay on that work. (Bryan Christensen Deposition, 
Vol. 2 Pg. 85) 
9. State Farm has been treating Chris1 Body Shop 
differently than they treat any other automobile body repair shop 
in town and by so doing have been discouraging customers from 
having work done at Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. (Bryan Christensen 
Deposition, Vo. 2 Pg. 94-95) 
10. That although plaintiffs at times utilized used or 
repaired parts while charging insurers, including State Farm, for 
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new parts, these actions were done only at the instruction and 
with the full understanding of the customers (insureds) for whom 
plaintiffs were working. (Bryan Christensen Deposition, Vol. 3 
Pg. 186-189) 
11. Defendant/respondent, State Farm, through its employees 
and Leon Maxwell, as an employee of State Farm as well as 
individually, have defamed plaintiffs by saying that plaintiffs 
were dishonest, did inferior work, were crooks and cheated their 
customers. (See Affidavits of Rob Nelson, Bryan Lund and Brent 
Buehler) 
13. After numerous depositions and other discovery the 
defendants made a Motion For Summary Judgment and the hearing on 
that Motion was held on the 22nd of May, 1989 before the 
honorable James S. Sawaya. 
14. In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
plaintiff submitted additional affidavits of Rob Nelson, Bryan 
Lund, and Brent Buehler in opposition of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Copies of these affidavits are attached in the 
Addendum. (Affidavit of Bryan Lund, Record Pg. 116 - 118, 
Affidavit of Rob Nelson, Record Pg. 140 - 142, Affidavit of Brent 
Buehler, Record Pg. 113 - 115) 
15. In his Affidavit, Bryan Lund stated that the defendant 
State Farm or employees thereof told him that Chris1 did inferior 
work, had a high number of dissatisfied customers, and implied 
that Chrisf Body Shop was dishonest and that Chris' Body would 
cheat on the work they did. State Farm further told Mr. Lund 
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that Chris' Body would not honor State Farm's bid and that they 
did not want him going to Chris1 Body to have his work done. (See 
Affidavit of Bryan Lund, Record Pg. 116 - 118) 
16. In Rob Nelson's Affidavit, he stated that the defendant 
told him that Chris' Body charged more for work than it was 
worth, that they did inferior work, that they were dishonest and 
sneaky in regards to their business dealings and that he could 
not take his car to Chris' Body Shop and have it paid for by 
State Farm. (Affidavit of Rob Nelson, Record Pg. 140 - 142) 
17. In his Affidavit, Brent Buehler states that defendants 
told him that plaintiffs charged more for work than it was worth, 
that they were unfair with their customers and cheated on 
repairs, that they charged more for their work than other body 
shops in the valley and that State Farm insisted that he have his 
car repaired at a shop other than Chris' Body Shop. (Affidavit of 
Brent Buehler, Record Pg. 113 - 115) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
On appeal from Summary Judgment the Appeal Court is to 
review evidence in light most favorable to the losing party, in 
this instance, the plaintiff. If there is any evidence in the 
form of deposition, affidavits, etc. that shows the existence of 
a genuine issue of material fact it is reversible error to grant 
Summary Judgment. The Trial Court, in the present case, erred in 
granting Summary Judgment on the basis that plaintiffs raised, 
through affidavits and deposition testimony, a great deal of 
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evidence that established a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the defamation claim. 
POINT II 
On appeal from Summary Judgment the Appeal Court is to 
review evidence in light most favorable to the losing party. In 
the present case the Trial Court erred in granting Summary 
Judgment on the basis that plaintiffs raised, through affidavits 
and deposition testimony, a great deal of evidence that 
established a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
tortious interference with prospective business relations claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH 
REGARDS TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF DEFAMATION 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a Motion of Summary Judgment shall be 
"rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter of 
law." 
The Courts have interpreted literally the wording "genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and have routinely established 
that itfs the moving party fs burden to show the lack of any 
material issue of fact. The Supreme Court in the recent case of 
Geneva Pipe Co. vs. S & H Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 
198 6) held "on appeal from a Summary Judgment, we review the 
evidence in light most favorable to the losing party" In the 
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Geneva Pipe Company case the Court held that granting of Summary 
Judgment was improper based upon the fact that one affidavit 
established evidence of a genuine issue of a material fact. This 
same position was repeated in the case of Ceco vs. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc. , 772 P. 2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989) wherein the 
Court held 
11
 a grant of Summary Judgment is appropriate only when 
no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law." 
The Court, in Ceco went on to hold, 
"and in deciding whether the trial court properly 
granted Judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing 
party, we give no deference to the trial court's view 
of the law, we review it for its correctness." (Id at 
969) 
In the present case, the plaintiffs filed a Complaint with 
one of its causes of actions being defamation. Plaintiffs have 
alleged that "defendants have established and carried out a 
continuous plan of defamation of plaintiff, Bryan Christensen and 
Chris1 Body & Paint Inc." (See Complaint, Para. 15) This 
defamation included telling customers and potential customers 
that plaintiffs did inferior work, that plaintiffs charged 
excessive amounts for the work they did, that plaintiffs were 
dishonest, that plaintiffs were crooks and that plaintiffs1 shop 
should be avoided and other shops were better automobile body 
repair shops. As a result of this defamation, plaintiffs allege 
that they have sustained irreparable damage to their reputation 
which has affected their business. 
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While plaintiffs recognize that under Utah Code Annotated 
Sections 45-2-3(3) certain communications are privileged, 
plaintiffs contend that the those communications alleged in the 
Complaint which plaintiffs intend to prove at the time of trial, 
do not fall within that parameters of said privilege. Section 
45-2-3(3) provides certain privileges in a defamation action 
which, in relevant part, is as follows: 
11
 In a communication, without malice to a person 
interested therein by one who is also interested or by 
one who stands in relation to the person interested as 
to afford a reasonable ground for supposing mode for 
communication innocent or who is requested by the 
person interested to give the information shall fall 
within the privilege designated by statute and 
therefore not be libelous or slanderous per se". 
(emphasis added) 
In paragraph 15 of plaintiffs1 Complaint, plaintiffs allege that, 
"defendants have established and carried out a continuous and 
willful plan of defamation of plaintiff Bryan Christensen and 
plaintiff Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. Furthermore, later in the 
Complaint, in paragraph 25, plaintiffs have alleged, 
"that defendants have consistently and maliciously told 
customers, prospective customers of Chris Body & Paint, 
Inc. that Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. was an inferior 
automobile repair shop, that Chris1 Body & Paint, Inc. 
engaged in dishonest or deceptive practices, that 
Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. routinely charged more that 
they should for automobile repair services which they 
perform and, that customers of Chris1 Body & Paint, 
Inc. should go elsewhere to have their body repair work 
done." 
Plaintiffs have established, through the deposition of Bryan 
Christensen as well as through the Affidavits of Lund, Nelson, 
and Buehler, that defendants carried out a continuous willful and 
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malicious plan of defaming plaintiffs and that as a result of 
such defamation, plaintiffs have been damaged through a loss of 
business and through general loss of reputation in the business 
community and the community at large. 
Defendants further recognize that, in certain instances, 
general claims of dishonesty or being a crook are not actionable, 
however, in the case of Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, (Utah 
1975) , the Utah Supreme Court recognized the actionability of 
allegations of dishonesty or criminality. In the Prince 
decision, the Supreme Court upheld a verdict based upon the 
following defamatory statements made by defendants: 
"calling the plaintiff names including he was a clever 
crook, etc. who was stealing from his own children, 
referring to the operation of a business and his 
efforts to sell it.11 
(Id at 1328) 
In affirming the jury's verdict, the Court held, 
"we have no disagreement with the defendant's 
contention that simply making some general statements 
about another being a crook or even using profanity in 
a general way may not be actionable slander. It may 
well depend on the circumstances. If words of that 
character are used in such a context or under such 
circumstances as they would reasonably be understood to 
come within the traditional requirement of liable or 
slander, that is to hold a person up to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule or to injure him in his business 
or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se; and the 
law presumes that damage will be suffered therefrom." 
Plaintiffs have made ample assertions that defendants have, on 
numerous occasions to prospective customers, made defamatory 
statements which include imputations as to plaintiffs' honesty in 
his business dealings and generally. Furthermore, plaintiffs 
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have claimed, and logic would establish that said defamatory 
statements have hurt their business. The affidavit of Brent 
Buehler, among other things, establishes this loss of business. 
Paragraph 17 of plaintiffs1 Complaint states: 
"that a direct result of the defamation of plaintiffs 
by the above named defendants, that plaintiffs have 
suffered monetary damages in an amount in excess of 
$50,000 in terms of lost jobs and lost customers." 
Furthermore, the allegations of dishonesty were made by 
defendants in the general course of discouraging potential 
customers from doing business with the plaintiffs. There is no 
question that allegations of dishonesty or allegations of being a 
crook were made in the context of and in furtherance of 
defendant's attempt to discourage customers from patronizing 
plaintiff's business. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ESTABLISHED A CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS 
INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS RELATIONS 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Is out, 657 P. 2d 293 established the elements 
necessary to establish a claim of tortious interference with 
prospective business relations as follows: 
1. That defendant intentionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs' existing or potential economic relations. 
2. For an improper purpose or by improper means. 
3. Causing injury to plaintiff. 
The plaintiffs have made various allegations and evidence 
gathered via the deposition of plaintiff as well as the 
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Affidavits of Lund, Nelson, Buehler establish that defendants 
interfered with prospective economic relations between the 
plaintiffs and various automobile owners desiring to have 
automobile body repair work done. The plaintiffs have outlined 
no less than twenty (20) such instances and in the deposition of 
Bryan Christensen. Plaintiffs further allege that there are 
others unknown and undiscoverable with whom defendants have 
interfered. The Supreme Court, in the case of Leigh Furniture, 
established the requirements to prove tortious interference as 
cited above. The Court went through an exhaustive analysis of 
improper purpose and made the following factual determination in 
that case as follows: 
"Taken in isolation each of the foregoing interference 
with Isomf s business might be justified as an overly 
zealous attempt to protect the Corporation's interest 
under its contract of sale. 
But in total and in cumulative effect, as a course of 
action extending over a period of three and one-half 
years and culminating in the failure of Isom1 s 
business, the Leigh corporation's acts cross a 
threshold beyond what is incidental and justifiable to 
what is tortious." (Id at 306) 
The case of Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
582 P.2d 1365 (Oregon 1978) addressed a factual situation which 
in some respects is similar to the case at hand. The Court, in 
Top Serv. Body Shop, Inc., although supporting the jury verdict 
of no cause, stated that a jury could have inferred improper 
purpose in defendant's conduct, but in this particular instance, 
such an inference was not supported by the evidence on record. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in the Leigh Furniture case held 
that defendant's could prove, in the alternative, either improper 
purpose and/or improper means. In defining improper means the 
Court stated as follows: 
"The alternative requirement of improper means is satisfied 
where the means used to interfere with a party !s economic 
relations are contrary to law such as violations of 
statutes, regulations, or recognized common law rules. Such 
acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and thence are 
clearly improper means of interference. 
Commonly included among improper means are violence, 
threats or intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, 
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation or 
disparaging falsehood." (Id @ 3 08 emphasis added) 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has issued the most recent Utah 
decision regarding tortious interference of prospective business 
relations in the case of Sampson v. Richins 770 P. 2d 998 (Utah 
App. 1989). In the Sampson decision this Court followed Leigh 
Furniture in holding that: 
"The improper means element is satisfied where the 
means used to interfere with a party's economic 
relations are contrary to law, such as violations of 
statutes regulations or recognized common law rules. 
Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and 
hence are clearly improper means of interference. Leigh 
Furniture 657 P. 2d 308 (Citations omitted) Improper 
means may also included violence, threats, or other 
intimidation, deceit, or misrepresentation, bribery, 
unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging 
falsehood. Id ("In Top Serv. Body Shop Inc. 582 P.2d 
1371). "Means may also be improper or wrongful because 
they violated an established standard of trade or 
profession." 
The Court, in Sampson, then held as improper means a list of 
thirteen violations established during the trial which thirteen 
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include, among others, misrepresentation, false statements and 
breach of agreement. (Id at 1004) 
In the present case the plaintiffs have alleged and 
established by affidavits and depositions each of the three 
elements required under Leigh Furniture and Sampson v. Richins. 
The potential interference with plaintiff's existing or potential 
economic relations is clearly established by the affidavits of 
Lund, Nelson, and particularly Buehler who, due to defendant's 
actions, was persuaded to take his vehicle to have it repaired 
elsewhere. The defendants further established, through 
deposition of Bryan Christensen, evidence to show that there was 
an improper purpose in taking these actions and both through 
depositions and through affidavits of Lund, Nelson, and Buehler 
that improper means were employed, which means included threats, 
intimidation, misrepresentation, defamation and disparaging 
falsehoods. Finally, the injury to plaintiffs is clearly 
established through deposition of Bryan Christensen wherein he 
demonstrated, in hard number figures, the decline of his business 
which he alleges was as a direct result of defendant's actions in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully submit 
that the Trial Court acted improperly in granting defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of defamation and 
tortious interference with plaintiff's prospective business 
relations. The plaintiff in this case has established through 
14 
depositions and affidavits the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact and as a matter of law the Court was improper in 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, plaintiffs 
request that this Court reverse the Summary Judgment and allow 
this matter to be brought to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / £ day ojf J^uary, 19! 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIDING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true akd 
copies of the above and foregoing Appellant1£ Brien: 
counsel for the Respondent, Glenn d. Hanr*i/ Atthrj 
Respondent, 6th Floor Boston Bldg., Salt take 
this //- d aY o f January, 1990. 
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JUN 1 2 1989 
GLENN C. HANNI, #A1327 
STEPHEN J- TRAYNER, #4928 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., 
a Utah corporation and 
BRYAN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearinq 
before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on May 22, 1989. Plaintiffs 
were represented by their attorney, Randall W. Richards. Defendants 
were represented by their attorneys, Glenn C. Hanni and Stephen J. 
Trayner. The court heard arguments of counsel, and having made and 
entered its Memorandum Decision, and being fully advised, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims of 
plaintiffs is hereby granted, and judgment is hereby entered in favor 
of defendants and against plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
yVMFY 
Bv. 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l No. C - 8 7 - 7 7 2 6 
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Dated t h i s /v day of J u n e , 1989 . 
BY THE COURT: 
J U D G E 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of June, 1989, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment, first-class 
postage prepaid, to: 
Randall W. Richards 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84 401 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4503 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
iCHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., a 
i'utah corporation and BRYAN 
JCHRISTENSEN, 
| 
I Plaintiffs, 
vs 
: STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE |CO. and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN LUND 
Judge: James S. Sawaya 
Civil No. C87-7726 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRYAN LUND, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah and own a car 
and in the past have had automobile body damage that needed to be 
repaired. 
2. On a number of occasions, I have gone to Chris' Body & 
Paint, Inc. for that repair work. They have done, in my 
opinion, superior work on the repairs that they have done and I 
have not had any problems with them in regards to the repair work 
they have done. 
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3. That on several occasions I have had body repair work 
done which was insured and covered by State Farm Insurance 
Company. On one occasion which occurred in the middle of May, 
1987, I took my car to the State Farm Offices to have it 
inspected and informed them that I would be having the work done 
at Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. 
4. When they discovered that I was going to have my work 
done at Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. the State Farm individual with 
whom I was dealing made a number of comments with regards to 
Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. Those comments are as follows: 
a. They (State Farm) told me that Chris' Body & Paint, 
|Inc. charged more for the work than it was worth. 
b. They (State Farm) told me that they did inferior wort 
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and that they charged more than any shop in town for that work. 
c. They (State Farm) told me that there were a lot of 
better shops in the valley that did much better quality work for 
much less money. 
d. They (State Farm) told me that they did not want me to 
go to Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. and they did everything in their 
power to discourage me from going there. 
e. They (State Farm) told me that Chris' Body & Paint, 
Inc. had an extremely high number of dissatisfied customers due 
to the inferior work they did and the high prices they charged. 
f. They (State Farm) told me that Chris' Body & Paint, 
Inc. would not honor the State Farm bids. 
g. They (State Farm) implied that Chris' Body & Paint, 
Inc. was dishonest in their business dealings and implied that 
they would cheat me on the automobile body repair work that they 
did. 
Further, your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
BRYAN KUND, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to this day of February, 1989 
NOTARY/PUBLIC 
Residing At: 
My Commission Expires: 
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RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4503 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS' BODY & PAINT, INC., a 
Utah corporation and BRYAN 
iCHRISTENSEN, 
I 
| Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
!STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CO. and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NELSON 
Judge: James S. Sawaya 
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Civil No. CS7-7726 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ROBERT NELSON, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah and own a car 
and in the past have had an occasion to have automobile body 
repair work done on that automobile. 
2. On one occasion, which occurred the first part of 
August, 1987, I had dealings with State Farm Insurance Company 
with regards to repairs on my automobile. 
3. On this occasion, I talked to State Farm individuals and 
had my car appraised. After the had the car appraised, I 
informed the State Farm individual that I would be taking the car 
to Chris's Body & Paint, Inc. They told me that Chris' Body & 
Paint, Inc. charged more for the work than it was worth. They 
told me that they did inferior work. 
4. The individual from State Farm told me that Chris' Body 
& Paint, Inc. ««jgas__ dishonest and sneaky with regards to their 
business dealings and advised me not to go to Chris' Body & 
Paint, Inc. to have my automobile body repair work done. 
5. When I informed them that notwithstanding their 
comments, I intended to take car to Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. , 
they informed me that I could not take my car to Chris' Body & 
Paint, Inc. 
Further, your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
ROBERT NELSON, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
February, 1980. 
NOTARY /PUBLIC 
Residing At: 
My Commission Expires: 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4 503 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRIS7 BODY & PAINT, INC., a 
Utah corporation and BRYAN 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CO, and LEON MAXWELL, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT BUEHLER 
Judge: James S. Sawaya 
Civil No. C87-7726 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
BRENT BUEHLER, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah and own a car 
and in the past have had an occasion to have automobile body 
repair work done on that automobile. 
2. On one occasion in the latter part of December, 1987 I 
had my car towed to Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. after it had been 
involved in an accident. I informed State Farm people that my 
car was there and that I wanted it repaired at Chris7 Body & 
Paint/ Inc. 
3. They (State Farm) told me that they refused to go to 
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Chris7 Body & Paint, Inc. to do an estimate on the vehicle. They 
informed me that State Farm refused to do any business with 
Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. 
4. That upon further inquiry as to reasons for this, they 
(State Farm) informed me that Chris' charges more for the work 
than it was worth, that they were unfair with their customers and 
that in the past Chris7 Body & Paint, Inc. had cheated on 
*—-
repair^ 
5. They (State Farm) informed me that Chris' Body & Paint, 
Inc. charged more for their work than other body shops in the 
Salt Lake valley and advised me to take it to another shop. 
6. They had the car towed from Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. to 
some place where the car was stored for a period of time and it 
[was later towed to another body shop for the repairs to be done. 
7. Upon inquiring as to the per hour labor rate at Chris' 
Body & Paint, Inc. and at the shop in which the car was repaired, 
I discovered that the labor rate was the same at both places. 
Further, I discovered that Chris' Body & Paint, Inc. charged less 
on mechanical repairs per hour than the shop that State Farm 
referred me to and had my car repaired at. 
8. That I ^nded up going to^this other automobile repair 
shop at the insistence of State Farm and had my car repaired at 
this other shop. 
9. That if I had been allowed to take my car to the shop of 
my preference, I would have had the repair work done at Chris' 
Body & Paint, Inc. 
10. That due to the actions of State Farm, the car towed an 
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additional two times and it cost me an additional month in time 
in trying to get my car repaired. 
Further, your affiant sayth not. 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
BRENT BUEH^ER, Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
February, 1989. 
day of 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY'PUBLIC 
Residing At: 
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